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Wahl: Cartesian Rationalism

Cartesian Rationalism
by RUSSELL WAHL
ROFESSOR REDMAN would begin his courses on early modem philosophy
by urging his students to understand Aristotelianism and to work through
Burtt's Metaphysical Foundations ofModern Physical Science so as to put the
work of the early modem philosophers, and in particular Descartes, in their
historical context, rather than attempting to understand them in a vacuum.
In this paper I anl going to continue in this vein, looking not so much at
Descartes' contemporaries and predecessors but at Descartes' metaphysical and
epistemological pronouncements in light of some of his other claims. This
situating, I believe, is especially important in Descartes studies because his work
was so influential and has often been used to characterize neat positions such as
the "Cartesian Quest for Certainty," "Cartesian Rationalism," "Cartesian
Scepticism," etc., which have become standard caricatures in philosophy. While
occasionally in the past some of these "Cartesian" views have been held up as
models of good philosophy, in recent times they are generally held to be the
foundations of all that is wrong with contemporary (or nearly contemporary)
philosophy.
I am going to examine one aspect of the caricature of Descartes, that of
Cartesian Rationalism, and argue that it needs to be radically revised in order to
take into account much of what Descartes actually says. The revised position
shows a much more moderate Descartes, one perhaps less useful for introducing
a radical anti-empiricism to an introductory class, but one far more interesting
and plausible.
Let's tum to the characterization of Descartes' rationalism that one can glean
from the literature. Here are two major features of this view which lead to this
characterization:
(a) One should believe only what is certain, for anything less than certainty
does not guarantee truth, and so does not constitute knowledge.
(b) What the senses tell us falls short of certainty, and therefore we should not
trust them; the senses do not yield knowledge; true knowledge, therefore, comes
from the understanding alone.
From these points it appears to follow that all that we can know will be based
on reason alone, and this may, at first thought, appear to be very little. Of course
Descartes argues for the existence ofa nondeceiving God and innate ideas within
the mind that are guaranteed to be true by this God, and thus allows that we may
know a fair amount. But it still looks as though all I can know will be based on
reason and not the senses.
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This view of Cartesian Rationalism is forcefully expressed by D. W. Hamlyn
and J. L. Watling, who claim that Descartes was committed to the position that
all tnlths are logically true.! Watling and Hamlyn appear to recognize that
Descartes himself never drew this consequence, but for them this is simply
evidence that he was inconsistent. Watling goes on as if Descartes were
committed to the view that we could by the understanding alone come to know
the truth ofthe proposition that there exists at least one table, 2 and that "Descartes
believed that he could show that truths of every so11 could be established without
the aid of observation and experiment."3
There are certainly many passages which may be taken to support this view
ofDescartes, for example, Rule 2 ofthe RulesJor
Rulesfor the Direction ofthe
oJthe Mind, which
ends with this renlark: "Now the conclusion we should draw from these
considerations is not that arithmetic and geometry are the only sciences worth
studying, but rather that in seeking the right path of truth we ought to concern
ourselyes only with objects which admit ofas much certainty as the demonstrations
of arithmetic and geometry."4 The "intuitions," which he holds are able to meet
this criterion, are contrasted in Rule 3 with what other people have thought and
with "the fluctuating testimony of the senses."5 There are also passages in the
Meditations and the Discourse on Method where Descartes nlakes it clear that he
is seeking knowledge that is completely certain and indubitable: " ... what
presented itself to my mind so clearly and so distinctly that I had no occasion to
doubt it."6 And there are ample passages in both works to suggest that what the
senses tell us is open to doubt. However, there are two points ofcaution we should
note before accepting the conclusion that all our knowledge should be based on
reason alone. The first is that in these passages Descartes is concerned with
intuitions (or ideas, in the later work) rather than beliefs. The second is that in the
later works, the Meditations and the Discourse, some care should be given to the
order of Descartes' presentation, for he suggests that some things we can doubt
until we have reasons (such as the proof of the existence of a nondeceiving God)
that remove the doubt.
But on the other hand, there are passages where Descartes suggests, in contrast
to the claim made by Watling, that observation is essential to knowledge. In the
Preface to the French edition of the Principles, for example, we have this passage:
I am also very well aware that many centuries may pass before all the truths that can be deduced from
these principles are actually so deduced. For the majority oftruths remaining to be discovered depend
on various particular observations which we never happen on by chance but which must be sought
out with care and expense by very intelligent people. 7
1. J. L. Watling. "Descartes." D. J. O·Conner.ed.. A Critical History ofWestern Philosophy (New York. 1964).
p. 172. See also D. W. Hamlyn. Theory of Knowledge (Garden City. N. Y.. 1970). p. 27. I have chosen Watling
and HamJyn here because they give an especially clear statement of this view of Cartesian rationalism.
2. Watling. p. 173.
3. Watling. p. 171.
4. Rules/or the Direction ofthe Mind. Cottingham. Stoodhof and Murdoch. trans.. The Philosophical Writings
of Descartes. Vol. I (Cambridge. 1985),12-13. Adam and Tannery. Vol. X. 366. All quotations from Descartes
will be from this edition, which will hereafter be abbreviated CSM: reference to the standard Adam and Tannery
edition will hereafter be abbreviated AT.
5. Rule 3. CSM [, ]4. AT X. 368.
6. Discourse on Method. CSM L 120. AT VI, 18.
7. Principles of Philosophy. CSM l. 189. AT IXB. 20.
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And again in the Discourse he suggests that a lack of observations (experiences)
could hinder knowledge. 8 These passages on foundations, as well as the actual
claims Descartes made in his scientific work, indicate that Descartes did not
think that all knowledge of matters of fact was independent of experience or that
he could come to all the truths of physics by reflection on innate ideas. It should
also be clear that Descartes was committed to the view that one could not come
to know the existence of, e.g., a table by "the understanding alone" if this is taken
as opposed to using the senses. For such knowledge would be possible only if the
idea of a table contained existence, and not merely possible existence, but
necessary existence, and Descartes holds that this is contained only in the idea
of God. 9 From his account of what kind ofexistence is contained within our ideas
of bodies it should be clear that he does not hold that we can come to know the
truth of the proposition "one table exists" simply by understanding it.
What conclusions should we draw? Perhaps that Descartes was inconsistent;
this is certainly the conclusion that Hanllyn and Watling draw. Or we could look
again at just what Descartes' project may be and attempt to see if perhaps
something else is at work when Descartes demands "certainty" and argues that
science must have firm foundations which can be detennined to be true by the
understanding. In what remains of this paper I am going to sketch a slightly
different account of Descartes' project, which is not so much a project, as I see
it, of reason replacing the senses, but rather of reason correcting what the senses
give us.
The claim that in order to be consistent Descartes must hold that all knowledge
is a priori is based on a particular view of Descartes' project. He is concerned
with knowledge, and it appears that his test for whether a proposition is known
by a subject S is whether S is certain that the proposition is true. The senses cannot
yield the kind of certainty demanded (and Descartes appears to be aware of this),
therefore a proposition that is based on reason rather than observation is the only
kind that could be known.
One puzzling thing about this account is that it is hard to find textual support
for a Cartesian account of when a proposition is known to be true. What we find
instead is an account of clear and distinct perception. In fact, while the fourth
Meditation concerns itself with judgement and with when we may judge
something to be true, Descartes' examples of the method in the fifth Meditation
consist of examining an idea and seeing what is clearly and distinctly contained
within it. We can then form propositions, e.g., "Godexists,''''material objects are
extended," "the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles," on the
basis of what we have perceived to be contained clearly and distinctly within our
ideas of God, a triangle, and a material object. But Descartes does not dwell so
much on this step; rather he devotes his attention to examining the content of
ideas (or, in his terms, what is objectively contained within our ideas). This is
what God guarantees: the content of our clear and distinct (mental) perceptions.
8. Discourse on Method. CSM l. 143. AT VI. 63.
9. In the Replies to the First Set of Objections. CSM II. 83. AT VII. 116.
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This matter is a bit confusing because Descartes often uses the term "truth"
when talking about perceptions, 10 yet in the third Meditation Descartes said that,
stlictly speaking, only judgements are true or false, not ideas. Thus it may be
natural to think that when Descartes says that a clear and distinct perception is
true, that he must be talking about judgements.
This is a problem that many others have noticed with Descartes' project,
starting with Arnauld. I I Alan Gewirth correctly notes that Descartes was not
concerned with whether an idea was expressed by a proposition or simply
characterized by a term. 12 Not surprisingly, Gewirth, like others, is reluctant to
use the term "true" except with regard to a proposition and so assumes that, when
Descartes uses the word "true" with respect to an idea, the idea must have a
propositional content. In the third Meditation Descartes' concern is with an
operation of the understanding, and not with judgement, which he argued always
involves the will. Thus even if, as is no doubt the case, many of Descartes'
"ideas" (in the Meditations) or 'Iointuitions" (in the Rules) would count as
propositions, we need to understand Descartes' method of obtaining clear and
distinct perceptions as arriving at a correct account of the content of what is
before the mind. In general, this will involve seeing what is contained within a
certain concept such as that of matter or of mind.
It may well be that as a consequence of this operation we will be in a position
to assent to a proposition, and thus some propositions will be such that we will
be able to perceive that they are true without any observations. The propositions
of the fifth Meditation ("God exists," "material things are extended," "the angles
oftriangles add up to two rightangles") are such propositions. Further, Descartes
no doubt held that all genuine knowledge requires the understanding of an
essence and so requires clear and distinct perception of the mind. But it does not
follow that all propositions assented to need to be based solely on the understanding. Sitting in the stove may be the proper method to determine the fundamental
concepts of physics, and perhaps some basic laws, but it should not be assumed
that sitting in the stove is the proper method to determine all truths whatsoever.
In a few places in the Meditations and Replies, Descartes characterized obscure and confused ideas as "materially false," and while there are certain
complications involved with his discussion, part of his response to Arnauld on
this matter is instructive. 13 Descartes was defending himself against the charge
that he was "confusing idea and judgement" and that there was a serious
confusion in calling the idea of cold "materially false." Roughly, Arnauld said
that if an idea exhibited something as positive, and cold was not something
positive, then the idea wasn't an idea of cold. 14 Descartes' response is,

n.

10. For example. in the fifth Meditation. at AT VII, 68 (CSM 47). where he talks about the "true ideas." and
at 65 (CSM II. 45). where he talks about properties being true.
1I. Fourth Set of Objections. CSM
145-46, AT VII, 206-07.
l2. Gewirth, "Clearness and Distinctness in Descartes." W. Doney. ed.. Descartes (Garden City, N. Y.. 1967).
p. 263. esp. n. 49. See Marjorie Grene. Descartes (Minneapolis. 1985), p. 8, for the view that Descartes replaces
judgements with ideas as the vehicle of truth.
13. In the third Meditation, for example. CSM II, 30. AT VII, 43. For the complications. see the discussion in
Margaret Wilson, Descartes (London, 1978). pp. 106-15, and Marjorie Grene, Descartes. p. 12.
14. Fourth Set of Objections. CSM II, 145, AT VII. 206.
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This is right; but my only reason for calling the idea "materially false" is that, owing to the fact that
it is obscure and confused, I am unable to judge whether or not what it represents to me is something
positive which exists outside my sensation. I5

And a few lines later he says that "materially false" ideas are those which provide
subject matter for error. His suggestion is that ideas from the senses, uncorrected
by reason, are those that will then provide subject matter for erroneous judgements. The kind ofjudgement he has in mind is one where we judge that a feature
of an idea captures a feature of the world as it is. It is not that a judgement that
is based on sensation will be untrustworthy so much as that a judgement which
contains ideas which are obscure and confused, which are based simply on
sensation, will be untrustworthy.
We can still wonder whether the Cartesian view is that we replace the ideas
of sense with ideas of the understanding, or rather use the understanding to
correct the ideas of sense. At one point, in the third Meditation, Descartes says
he has two ideas of the sun: "One of them, which is acquired as it were from the
senses and which is a prime example of an idea which I reckon to come from an
external source, makes the sun appear very small. The other idea is based on
astronomical reasoning, that is, it is derived from certain notions which are innate
in me (or else constructed by me in some other way), and this idea shows the sun
to be several times larger than the earth." 16
Now Descartes does certainly imply that these are two different ideas, and as
this example is gi yen in the course of a discussion on the origin of ideas, one
might certainly think that ideas are either from outside or innate or constructed
in some way where the "or" is taken as exclusive. Such a conclusion would
certainly support the standard characterization of Descartes' rationalism. But
should we really foist on Descartes the view that the second idea ofthe sun comes
from the understanding alone? In the fairly late Comments on a Certain Broadsheet Descartes said,
I have never written or taken the view that the mind requires innate ideas which are something distinct
from its own faculty of thinking. I did, however, observe that there were certain thoughts within me
which neither came to me from external objects nor were detennined by my will, but came solely
from the power ofthinking within me.... This is the same sense as that in which we say that generosity
is "innate" in certain families, or that certain diseases such as gout or stones are innate in others: it
is not so much that the babies of such families suffer from these diseases in their mother's womb, but
simply that they are born with a certain Hfaculty" or tendency to contract them. 17

Descartes is denying that innate ideas are little mental objects always existing in
the mind and suggesting they are more like capacities or faculties for thinking
certain things, abilities to process certain information and come to certain
conclusions. It would be absurd to think of this second idea of the sun (including
its size) as being innate in the sense that it is always there independent of any
observations we have made. But what is there is the ability to do geometry and
operate on what the senses give and "correct" the initial picture that the senses
15. Fourth Set ofReplles. CSM II, 164, AT VII. 234.
16. Fourth Meditation. CSM [I, 27. AT VII, 39.
17. Comments on a Certain Broadsheet. CSM I. 303-04. AT VIIIB, 357-58.
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give. This second idea of the sun, then, is not so much an idea of the understanding which has replaced the one from the senses, but rather an idea formed by the
understanding operating on the idea from the senses.
We are now in a position to sketch a more rational picture of Cartesian
Rationalism. There is indeed an emphasis on certainty and on the role of reason.
But I would suggest the primary emphasis of the quest for certainty is not on the
justification of beliefs but on the clarification of concepts which go to make up
those beliefs. Once these are clear, one is then in a position to make observations.
These observations will be directed toward certain features in the world, those
that reason says are important because they are contained within the concept of
matter. The fundamental principles of physics will be based solely on the
concepts, and thus knowable a priori, but many other principles will be based on
hypotheses. The hypotheses formed and then tested will be based on these
antecedently given principles, in that these principles will limit the possibilities
of acceptable hypotheses. 18
The use of observation and hypotheses may still seem at odds with the
Cartesian exhortation to "holdback assent from opinions which are not con1pletely
certain and indubitable,"19 and, keeping this exhortation in mind, we may well
wonder whether we should believe anything at all about the size of the sun
(except perhaps that it has some size), but in the sixth Meditation Descartes is
much more optimistic:
Despite the high degree of doubt and uncertainty involved here, the very fact that God is not a
deceiver, and the consequent impossibility of there being any falsity in my opinions which cannot
be corrected by some other faculty supplied by God, offers me a sure hope that I can attain the truth
even in these matters. 20

Here we see a familiar argument: that if there is no way to correct what we have
before the mind, then, if it is not true, God would be a deceiver.
The conclusion should not be that by reason alone (if this is taken in contrast
to the senses) we are able to know what the correct size of the sun is. Rather, that
if we understand what a n1aterial substance is and the laws of geometry, and we
make careful observations with these principles in mind, we can trust our results
to be accurate. Here we have reason interpreting what the senses give it. (And
correcting what the senses give, if you think, as Descartes appears to, that the
senses give us a small sun.) This interpreted account will not be something the
senses by themselves tell us, but it does not appear to be anything that reason by
itself tells us either.

18. See Desmond Clarke, Descartes' Philosophy o/Science
ofScience (University Park, Pa., 1982), especially Chapters
V and VI for more on Descartes' use of hypotheses, and Gary Hatfield, "First Philosophy and Natural Philosophy
in Descartes," A. J. Holland, ed., Philosophy, Its History and Historiography (Dordrecht, 1985), for a discussion
of observation.
19. First Meditation, CSM II, 12, AT VII, 18.
20. Sixth Meditation, CSM II, 55-56, AT VII, 80.
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